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Reported  bank  profits  have  been  in  a  strongly 
rising  trend.  The  rate  of  return  on  equity,  at  about 
14  percent,  is  close  to  a  post-World-War-H  high. 
Bankers  are  congratulating  themselves  on  their  fine 
performance,  and  the  frowns  that  bank  regulators 
used  to  wear  when  bank  loan  losses  were  escalating 
some  years  back  have  changed  back  to  deadpan. 
Only  the  stock  market  is  striking  a  sour  note.  The 
growth  of  bank  earnings  has  exceeded  that  of  most 
corporations.  Nevertheless,  the  market  prices  the 
stocks  of  many  large  American  banks  at  four  to  six 
times  earnings,  well  below  the  average  for  industrials. 
Quite  a few  large  banks  are  selling  at  sharp  discounts 
from  book  value.  Does  the  market  see  something 
that  the  bankers  and  the  regulators  do  not  see? 
The  Stock  Market’s  View  The  market  could  be 
skeptical  of  the  condition  of  banks.  Banks  have  had 
their  share  of troubles  in  the  past,  as  with  Real  Estate 
Investment  Trusts  (REITs)  and  tanker  loans. 
Today,  concern  might  stem,  for  instance,  from  bank 
involvement  in  loans  to  developing  countries.  But 
past  bad  loans  have  on  the  whole  been  worked  off 
quite  satisfactorily.  Present  loss  experience  in  inter- 
national  lending  has  been  substantially  better  than  at 
home.  While  concern  about  the  condition  of  the 
banks  was  justified  at  the  time  of  the  Franklin  and 
Herstatt  failures  in  1974,  there  is  no  obvious  reason 
for  it  now. 
The  market  could  be  skeptical  also  of  the  quality 
of bank  management.  However,  with  the  high  regard 
that  I  have  for  the  many  bankers  I  have  been  privi- 
leged  to  meet,  I  can  see  no  reason  why  their  perform- 
ance,  as  a  group,  should  be  evaluated  by  the  market 
less  favorably  than  the  performance  of  industrial  ex- 
ecutives.  So  there  must  be  some  other  reason. 
Bankers’  Doubts  Inflation  might  account  for  the 
low  esteem  in  which  banks  are  held  by  the  stock 
market.  On  the  surface,  it  could  be  argued  that 
inflation  must  have  been  good  for  banks.  Their 
reported  assets  have  risen  faster  during  inflation  than 
during  ordinary  times.  After  all,  the  essence  of 
inflation  is  an  increase  in  credit  and  money,  including 
bank  credit  and  bank  deposits.  Interest  rates  are 
high,  and  many  people  believe  that  bankers  profit 
from  high  interest  rates.  Of  course,  the  banks  lose 
something  on  their  assets  as  money  depreciates.  But 
don’t  they  gain  it  back  from  the  depreciation  of. their 
liabilities?  So  it  looks  as  if  inflation  is  just  money- 
in-money-out,  and  of  no concern  to  the  banker.  That 
seems  to  be  the  view  of  the  casual  observer. 
That  inflation  doesn’t  hurt  banks  seems  to  be 
argued  on  still  other  grounds.  Bankers  are  blissfully 
free  from  the  accounting  problems  of  capital  replace- 
ment  and  inventory  that  trouble  industrial  executives 
during  infIation.  They  know  that  inflation  distorts 
corporate  accounting  by  generating  fictitious  profits 
from  inventories  and  underdepreciation.  Banks, 
having  next  to  no  inventory  or  fixed  assets,  are 
immune  to  these  pitfalls.  So  why  should  inflation 
hurt  them? 
Banks  Are  Net  Creditors  What  some  people 
seem  to  overlook  is  that  bankers  are  net  creditors. 
Once  we  focus  on  that  fact,  suspicion  is  bound  to 
mount  that  it  is  indeed  inflation  that  is  ailing  the 
banks.  The  banks  are  creditors,  and  creditors  are 
born  losers  in  inflation.  Their  paper  assets  are  larger 
than  their  liabihties.  Their  capital,  therefore,  except 
for  what  little  real  estate  and  equipment  they  have, 
is  also  invested  in  paper  assets.  These  paper  assets 
depreciate  with  inflation.  The  bank’s  capital  depreci- 
ates with  them. 
The  banks  add  to  their  capital  each  year,  of  course, 
through  retentions  of  profits.  Recently  these  re- 
tentions  have  amounted  to  some  8-10  percent  of 
equity,  after  dividends  of  about  4-5  percent  of  book 
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the  book  value  of  banks  will  rise  in  constant  dollars. 
From  1972  to  1979,  book  value  rose  from  $55  billion 
(equity  and  reserves)  to  $99  billion.  Part  of  this 
80  percent  increase,  although  only  a  small  part,  is 
due  to  new  stock  issues  and  the  like,  but  the  great 
bulk  is  due  to  retention  of  profit.  But  during  the 
same  period  the  price  level  rose  by  74  percent.  Thus, 
almost  the  entire  increase  in  book  value,  and  certainly 
all  the  retentions,  were  swallowed  up  by  inflation. 
Bankers  sometime  point  out  that  the  same  calcu- 
lation  can  be  made  with  respect  to  the  book  value  of 
any  industrial  corporation.  Since  inventories  and 
fixed  assets  are  carried  at  cost,  book  value  rises  only 
with  retentions  unless  there  are  new  stock  issues. 
So  why  single  out  banks  for  this  calculation?  Nobody 
worries  much  about  the  book  value  of  corporations. 
Earning  power  is  what  counts.  Why  should  banks 
be  any  different? 
Bank  Book  Value  Means  Something  The  answer 
is  that  the  book  value  of  an  industrial  corporation 
and  of  a  bank  are  indeed  very  different  creatures. 
The  present  value  of  the  fixed  assets  and  inventories 
of a corporation  can  fluctuate  widely.  Carrying  these 
assets  on  the  books  at  historical  cost  is  simply  an 
accounting  convention.  Particularly  with  inflation, 
the  market  value  of  these  “hard”  assets,  or  at  least 
their  replacement  cost,  is  bound  to  rise.  When  the 
price  level  has  doubled  or  quadrupled,  as  it  has  in 
the  United  States  since  1969  and  1945,  respectively, 
the  book  value  of  fixed  assets  has  indeed  become 
meaningless. 
A  bank  is  very  different.  Its  assets  are  primarily 
monetary.  Its  book  value,  therefore,  is  a fairly  mean- 
ingful  description  of  its  value  as  an  enterprise.  Of 
course,  the  bank’s  market  value  may  fluctuate  above 
or  below  book  value.  If  earnings  provide  a  high 
return  on  book,  the  market  will  pay  more  than  book. 
For  poor  earnings,  it  will  pay  less,  as  it  is  doing 
today  for  a  number  of  larger  banks.  Unfriendly 
critics  have  been  heard  to  say  that  such  banks  are 
worth  more  dead  than  alive,  i.e.,  they  could  be  liqui- 
dated  at  a  profit  above  their  market  value.  Market 
value  can  and  does  differ  from  liquidating  or  book 
value,  because  nobody  thinks  of  liquidating  banks. 
But  book  value  nevertheless  is  a much  more  meaning- 
ful  indicator  of  underlying  value  for  a  bank  than  it  is 
in  the  case  of  a  corporation. 
That  is  why  it  makes  some  sense  to  measure  a 
bank’s  book  value  in  terms  of  constant  dollars.  If 
over  a period  of years  it  has  not  changed  significantly, 
this  means  that  all  the  additions  to  capital,  from 
retentions  and  otherwise,  have  just  been  sufficient 
to  preserve  its  real  value.  In  other  words,  the  loss 
to  bank  capital  from  inflation  has  been  about  equal  to 
the  retentions. 
HOW to  Calculate  the  Inflation  Loss  This  very 
summary  calculation  can  be  made  a  little  more 
sophisticated  by  allowing  for  the  fact  that  banks 
usually  own  their  buildings  and  perhaps  some  other 
real  estate  and  equipment.  For  a  large  bank,  these 
hard  assets  typically  amount  to  about  one  percent 
of  total  assets  or  a  little  more  than  one-fifth  of  net 
worth.  During  inflation,  the  market  value  or  at  least 
the  replacement  cost  of  hard  assets  rises.  The  exact 
change  may  be  difficult  to  measure,  and  in  any  case 
will  vary  among  banks.  But  a  not  unreasonable 
approximation  suggests  that  they  rise  with  the  gen- 
eral  price  level.  One  can  reasonably  argue,  therefore, 
that  the  part  of  the  bank’s  net  worth  that  is  matched 
by  hard  assets  is  in  some  degree  protected  against 
inflation.  This  means  that  about  one-fifth  of  net 
worth  of  the  average  large  bank  is  protected  against 
inflation,  while  about  four-fifths  are  exposed.  Some 
banks  may  be  able  to  improve  on  these  relationships 
by  making  other  “nonmonetary  investments.” 
Given  these  premises,  it  is  difficult  to  avoid  making 
the  following  rough  calculation.  If  inflation  is  10 
percent,  and  if a bank’s  net  worth  is  protected  only  to 
the  extent  of  one-fifth  against  inflation,  the  inflation 
loss  on  the  real  value  of  the  bank’s  equity  amounts 
to  8  percent  of  net  worth.  This  loss  needs  to  be  de- 
ducted  from  the  bank’s  rate  of  return  on  net  worth. 
This,  as  noted  before,  recently  has  been  about  14 
percent  of  net  worth.  Therefore,  about  6  percent  is 
what  is  left  after  this  inflation  adjustment.  If  the 
bank  paid  a  dividend  of  about  one-third  of  its  earn- 
ings,  i.e.,  5  percent  on  capital,  it  was  paying  out  in 
fact  most  of  its  real  earnings.  The  9  percent  that  it 
thought  it  was  adding  to  net  worth  was  almost  all 
absorbed  by  inflation. 
The  Painful  Truth  Many  bankers  may  have  been 
able  to  ignore  these  unpleasant  implications.  The 
stock  market  has  not.  The  stock  market  seems  clearly 
to  have  observed  the  damage  that  inflation  is  doing  to 
banks,  and  has  remained  quite  unimpressed  by  the 
seemingly  glowing  earnings  reports. 
I  need  hardly  tell  you  that,  if  I  were  a  banker,  I, 
too,  would  prefer  not  to  take  account  of  these  un- 
pleasant  matters.  It  is discouraging,  having  worked 
hard,  to  find  that  the  results,  inflation-adjusted,  are 
poor.  It  is  even  harder  if my  pay  or  bonus  were  to  be 
based  on  inflation-adjusted  earnings.  I  would  much 
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had  suffered,  in  terms  of  the  price  of  his  stock,  was 
due  to  the  vagaries  of  the  stock  market  than  to  any- 
thing  I  had  done  or  failed  to  do. 
Efforts  to  ignore  the  impact  of  inflation  and  reject 
the  adjustment  of  bank  statements  and  particularly 
earnings  for  inflation  have,  of  course,  a  very  respect- 
able  ancestry.  In  1977,  the  Inter-Association  Com- 
mittee  on  Bank  Accounting  (IACBA)  undertook  a 
massive  study  of  inflation  accounting  for  banks,  em- 
ploying  the  research  of  three  separate  advisory 
groups  (Arthur  D.  Little;  Peak,  Marwick,  Mitchell 
& Co.;  and  Robert  Morris  Associates).  The  IACBA 
arrived  at  the  conclusion  that  there  was  no  need  for 
any  changes  in  bank  accounting  to  reflect  inflation. 
Characteristic  of this  view  is  the  following  quote  from 
one  of  the  study  papers  (Peat,  Marwick,  Mitchell  & 
Co.,  page  3)  :  “General  purchasing  power  reporting 
is  neither  necessary  nor  desirable  in  the  financial 
statements  or  as  supplemental  data.”  “The  capital 
maintenance  concept  appropriate  for  bank  accounting 
and  reporting  is  financial  capital  in  units  of  money.” 
If  this  is  accountants’  language  to  say  that  a  bank  is 
maintaining  its  capital  if,  after  years  of  inflation,  the 
equity  account  shows  an  unchanged  number  of 
dollars,  some  bankers  and  some  accountants  will  one 
day  have  an  unhappy  awakening. 
Enter  FASB  More  recently,  however,  the  Finan- 
cial  Accounting  Standards  Board  (FASB)  added  to 
their  accounting  standards  a  requirement  that  large 
banks  make  a  supplementary  statement  in  their  an- 
nual  reports  showing  selected  financial  data  adjusted 
for  the  effects  of  changing  prices.  This  mandate 
applies  to  about  150  bank  holding  companies  and  20 
savings  and  loans  or  savings  and  loan  holding  com- 
panies  with  assets  over  $1  billion.  Annual  statements 
now  becoming  available  contain  this  information, 
usually  somewhere  in  the  back  pages  and  sometimes 
accompanied  by  cautionary  language  explaining  that 
it  does  not  mean  anything.  The  classical  comment 
along  these  lines  that  sticks  in  my  mind  IS:  “We 
believe  these  numbers  are  not  relevant  in  managing 
the  business  of  the  corporation.” 
What  is  the  nature  of  the  adjustments  required  by 
FASB,  and  why  are  they  so  sharply  resisted  by  some 
of  the  reluctant  practitioners?  Every  stock  market 
analyst  has  been  able  to  make  these  calculations  for 
himself  for  many  years.  I  am  reminded  of  the  words 
of  Bishop  Joseph  Butler  spoken  in  1726  and  recently 
unearthed  in  Foreign  Affairs:  “Facts  and  actions  are 
what  they  are,  and  the  consequences  of  them  will  be 
what  they  will  be.  Why  then  should  we  wish  to  be 
deceived?” 
FASB’s  principal  inflation  adjustment  technique 
applicable  to  banks,  known  as  constant-dollar  ac- 
counting,  does  in  a sophisticated  way  what  my  simple 
rules  of  thumb  employed  at  the  outset  have  attempted 
to  do.  They  take  account  of  the  net  creditor  position 
of  the  bank,  known  as  the  net  monetary  assets  posi- 
tion,  and  arrive  at  a  broad  measure  of  the  inflation 
loss  by  applying  the  consumer  price  index  to  this 
magnitude.  As  noted,  the  net  monetary  asset  posi- 
tion  broadly  speaking  is  equal  to  the  bank’s  capital 
minus  hard  assets  (and  also  minus  certain  financial 
assets  treated  as  the  equivalent  of  hard  assets).  A 
second  and  much  smaller  adjustment  is  added,  in  the 
form  of  an  upward  revaluation  of  the  small  volume 
of a bank’s  nonmonetary  assets-building,  equipment, 
and  a  few  others-and  an  upward  restatement  of  de- 
preciation  on  the  revalued  nonmonetary  assets.  The 
net  effect  of  these  adjustments  is  that  allowance  for 
the  hard  assets  improves  the  bank’s  profit  picture 
but  that  this  improvement  is  far  outweighed  by  the 
relatively  large  loss  on  the  net  monetary  asset  position 
and  the-usually  minute-increase  in  depreciation 
charges. 
What  are  the  reasons  that  so  many  of  the  critics 
and  mandated  practitioners  give  for  their  apparent 
rejection  of  these  techniques,  other,  of  course,  than 
that  they  do  not  like  the  results?  One  is  that  the 
techniques  were  developed  for  industrial  corporations 
with  heavy  fixed  assets  and/or  inventories.  Many 
though  not  all  such  corporations  are  net  debtors. 
That  is,  financial  (monetary)  assets  are  less  than 
their  debt;  their  (nonmonetary)  fixed  assets  and 
inventory,  therefore,  are  larger  than  their  net  worth. 
Applying  the  inflation  adjustment  to  this  negative 
net  monetary  asset  position,  therefore,  produces  a 
gain  from  inflation.  The  adjustments  made  to  fixed 
assets,  by  raising  depreciation,  and  to  inventories,  by 
putting  them,  in  effect,  on  a  LIFO  basis,  reduce 
profits.  Which  of  the  two  adjustments  outweighs 
the  other  varies  from  corporation  to  corporation,  in 
accordance  with  the  degree  of  leverage.  Heavily 
leveraged  corporations  usually  show  an  inflation  gain 
from  this  method. 
Bank  accountants  seem  to  be  of  the  opinion  that 
this  technique  is  appropriate  for  corporations  but  in- 
appropriate  for  banks.  Banks  lack  sizable  nonmone- 
tary  assets  and,  therefore,  tend  to  be  net  creditors. 
In  my  opinion,  the  opposite  is  correct.  I  have  grave 
doubts  about  the  appropriateness  of  considering  the 
gain  from  a negative  net  monetary  asset  position,  i.e., 
from  being  a  debtor,  as  a  true  gain  worthy  of  being 
included  in  the  income  account.  It  produces  no  cash 
flow,  cannot  be  used  to  pay  taxes  or  dividends,  and 
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value  in  a  very  broad  sense. 
For  a  bank,  these  considerations  are  irrelevant, 
There  are  no  significant  nonmonetary  assets  to  re- 
value  and  depreciate.  But  the  inflation  loss  on  the 
bank’s  net  monetary  asset  position  is  very  real.  A 
bank  stockholder  is  very  much  like  a  stockholder  in  a 
bond  fund  or  money  market  mutual  fund,  except  that 
he  is  heavily  leveraged.  The  latter  knows  that  the 
underlying  assets  are  losing  their  purchasing  power 
and  that  he  can  preserve  the  purchasing  power  of  his 
own  investment  only  if  these  assets  produce  a  rate  of 
return  in  excess  of  the  rate  of  inflation.  The  same 
is  true  of  the  bank  stockholder:  Unless  the  return 
on  equity  exceeds  the  rate  of  inflation-with  some 
allowance  for  hard  assets-his  investment  is  losing 
purchasing  power.  That  is  why  the  supplementary 
inflation-adjusted  statements  for  banks  make  a  good 
deal  of  sense. 
Some  Concluding  Questions  These  conclusions, 
if  they  are  valid,  pose  a  vast  range  of  questions, 
running  from  the  value  of  bank  stocks  to  regulatory 
policy  with  respect  to  bank  capital  and  bank  expan- 
sion  and  to  the  financing  of  our  economy.  Here  I 
shall  deal  only  with  the  narrowest  implications  con- 
cerning  bank  profits. 
One  very  obvious  implication  about  which  the 
banks  unfortunately  are  unable  to  do  anything  relates 
to  taxes.  If  bank  profits  adjusted  for  inflation  are 
smaller  than  unadjusted  profits,  banks  obviously  pay 
out  more  in  taxes  than  the  legislator,  unaware  of 
inflation,  intended  them  to  pay.  Banks  share  this  fate 
with  nonfinancial  firms.  Since  banks  already  pay  a 
lower  effective  tax  rate  than  most  nonfinancial  firms, 
it  would  come  with  poor  grace  from  them  to  be  the 
first  in  demanding  relief.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
tax  overload  from  inflation  is  well  known  in  the  case 
of corporations.  Legislators  have  tried  to  compensate 
by  devices  such  as  accelerated  depreciation  and  the 
investment  tax  credit,  neither  of  which  is  of  signifi- 
cant  value  to  banks. 
Larger  holdings  of hard  assets  on  the  part  of banks 
might  be  a  means  of  defending  their  capital  at  least 
in  an  accounting  sense.  Since  banks  must  not  become 
manufacturing  corporations,  such  hard  assets  pre- 
sumably  would  have  to  be  limited  to  real  estate- 
except  perhaps  for  assets  that  can  be  owned  for 
leasing  purposes.  The  historical  record  of  bank  real 
estate  investments  is  not  particularly  encouraging. 
Moreover,  regulators  have  strongly  discouraged  in- 
vestment  in  bank  buildings,  at  least  initially,  in  excess 
of  40  percent  of  capital,  although  member  banks  are 
allowed  to  invest  in  their  bank  premises  to  an  amount 
equal  to  their  capital  stock.  Even  poorly  selected 
investments  would  give  banks  some  protection  against 
the  adjustments  required  by  FASB,  because  they 
would  reduce  the  net  monetary  asset  position,  but 
they  would  be  a  menace  to  both  a  bank  and  its  de- 
positors  and  stockholders. 
Inflation-oriented  pricing  of  bank  credit  and  ser- 
vices  is  another  possibility.  Banks  could  achieve  a 
rate  of  return  sufficient  to  compensate  for  capital 
attrition  from  inflation  if  they  were  to  price  accord- 
ingly.  There  is  some  evidence,  in  the  recent  gradual 
upcreep  of  the  rate  of  return,  that  banks  are  trying 
to  cope  with  the  problem  of  capital  attrition  in  this 
manner.  But  at  present  rates  of  inflation  they  are 
still  far  from  achieving  this  objective.  On  the  con- 
trary,  there  is  a  widespread  impression  among  the 
public  (and  some  regulators)  that  banks  are  making 
enormous  profits.  Higher  profits,  even  though  modest 
after  adjustment  for  inflation,  might  arouse  wide- 
spread  public  criticism.  Bankers  are  doing  them- 
selves  little  favor  by  not  educating  the  public  (and 
themselves)  to  the  realities  of  bank  inflation  ac- 
counting. 
Lower  dividends  would  be  still  another  line  of 
defense.  Retentions  could  be  raised,  in  the  unrealistic 
case  of  total  omission  of  dividends,  up  to  equality 
with  the  rate  of  return.  This  would  protect  bank 
capital  at  least  so  long  as  the  rate  of  return  on  capital 
remained  in  excess  of  the  rate  of  inflation.  It  would 
be  poor  comfort  for  the  stockholder,  of  course,  to 
know  that  his  principal  was  protected  only  by  denying 
him  the  fruits  of  it.  However,  so  long  as  the  payment 
of  dividends  does  not  Lead  to  price  levels  for  bank 
stocks  at  which  new  equity  issues  become  a  realistic 
possibility,  dividends  seem  to  serve  no  functional 
purpose  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  bank. 
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